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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, ] 
Plaintiff/Appellee, ] 
-vs- ] 
DAVID CRAIG CARLSEN, | 
Defendant/Appellant. ] 
i Case No. 930372-CA 
i Case Type: APPEAL 
> Priority No. 2 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
This is an appeal from a criminal judgment in the First 
Circuit Court, County of Cache, State of Utah, Logan City 
Department pursuant to the provisions of Rule 26 of the Utah 
Rules of Criminal Procedure and Utah Code Ann. § 77-18a-l, 
(1953 as amended). The jurisdiction is invoked upon this 
Honorable Court to entertain this appeal under the provisions 
of Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(d), and § 78-4-11, (1953 as amended). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED 
1. Whether or not the statute under which the Defendant 
was charged and convicted, Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-62 (1987 
Amendment) is unconstitutionally vague as applied and enforced 
in this case in violation of the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and 
whether the trial court violated the Separation of Powers 
provision under Article V, § 1 of the Utah Constitution by 
altering the provisions of Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-62 in its 
instruction to the jury as to the elements of the offense 
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of Following another Vehicle Too Closely. 
The standard of review to review this issue on appeal 
is that Court of Appeals reviews the trial court's decision 
on the constitutionality of the statute for correctness, 
according no deference to its legal conclusions. State v. 
James, 819 P.2d 781, 796 (Utah 1991). Court of Appeals will 
not rewrite a statute or ignore its plain language in order 
to reach a constitutional construction. Provo City Corp. v. 
Wilden, 768 P.2d 455, 458 (Utah 1989). 
The Defendant preserved this issue for appeal by first 
raising the issue of the constitutionality of the statute by 
filing a written Motion to Dismiss the Information in the 
Logan City Municipal Justice Court. The Justice Court denied 
the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss on December 11, 1992. The 
Defendant again raised the issue of the constitutionality of 
the statute, § 41-6-62 in the trial denovo in the Circuit Court 
by making a verbal Motion in Arrest of Judgment after the verdict 
of the jury and prior to imposition of sentence on March 26, 
1993. 
DETERMINATIVE LAWS 
The following determinative laws of this case are set 
forth in verbatim in the Addendum: 
Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-62 (1987 Amendment). 
Fourteenth Amendment, United States Constitution. 
Article V, § 1, Utah Constitution. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case: 
The Defendant was initially charged by Information in the 
Logan City Municipal Justice Court with one count of Following 
another Vehicle Too Closely in violation of Utah Code Ann. 
§ 41-6-62, (1987 Amendment), a class C misdemeanor. 
B. Course of Proceedings: 
The Defendant prior to a bench trial in the Logan City 
Municipal Justice Court filed a written Motion to Dismiss the 
Information on grounds that the statute under which he was 
charged was unconstitutionally vague both on its face and as 
applied in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution. 
The Defendants Motion to Dismiss was denied by the Justice 
Court on December 11, 1992. A bench trial proceeded as scheduled 
on that same date and the Justice Court Judge sitting without a 
jury rendered a verdict of guilty against the Defendant for the 
offense of Following another Vehicle Too Closely in violation of 
Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-62 as charged in the Information. Judgment 
and sentence was imposed the same day whereupon the Defendant 
was sentenced to pay a $ 50.00 fine and to serve four days in 
jail to be suspended upon payment of the fine. The Defendant 
thereafter filed a Notice of Appeal to appeal his conviction to 
the First Circuit Court of the State of Utah, County of Cache, 
Logan City Department. 
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A hearing on Defendant's Motion to Dismiss the Information 
was held in the First Circuit Court on January 26, 1993 where 
the Court reserved a decision on Defendant's Motion until all 
of the facts were to be adduced at trial. 
A hearing was held on February 0, 1993 in the First Circuit 
Court on on Defendant's Motion to Suppress Evidence on the basis 
that Logan City Police Officer, Russell J. Roper did not have 
a reasonable articulate suspicion to believe that the Defendant 
had committed a criminal offense or engaged in criminal activity 
by seizing the Defendant by making a U-turn from a parked position 
and following and thereafter stopping the Defendant. The Court 
on the same date denied the Defendant's Motion to Suppress. 
A jury trial was held in the First Circuit Court on March 
26, 1993. The jury returned a verdict of guilty to the offense 
of following another vehicle too closely. The Defendant made 
a verbal motion in arrest of judgment pursuant to Rule 23 of 
the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure on the grounds that the 
evidence adduced at trial was insufficient to sustain the con-
viction and on the basis that statute under which he was con-
victed, Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-62 as applied and enforced against 
the Defendant was unconstitutionally vague in violation of the 
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution. The Circuit Court denied the Defendant's 
Motion in Arrest of Judgment and thereupon imposed judgment and 
sentence on the same date. 
-4-
The Defendant thereafter timely filed a Motion for a New 
Trial in the First Circuit Court on grounds that the prosecutor 
knowingly used the false testimony of Russell J. Roper, first 
to avoid suppression of the evidence at the suppression hearing 
and/ secondly, at trial to obtain a conviction against the 
Defendant. A further basis for Defendant's Motion for a New 
Trial was that the jury was improperly influenced by the Court's 
numerous statements and remarks during Officer Roper's testimony 
giving such testimony greater weight and depriving the Defendant 
of a fair and impartial jury trial. The trial court without 
conducting a hearing, denied the Defendant's Motion for a New 
trial on the 5th day of May, 1993. The Defendant filed his 
Notice of Appeal to appeal his conviction to the Utah Court of 
Appeals on the 4th day of June, 1993. 
C. Statement of Facts: 
This case in reality began in December, 1988, when the 
Defendant was acquitted of charges brought against him for the 
offense of Driving on Revocation by Russell J. Roper and former 
Logan City Police Officer, Greg Monroe in a jury trial held in 
the First Circuit Court. An additional count of Driving on 
Revocation was also dismissed by the Court because of the lack 
of any Notice by Driver License Services to the Defendant that 
his License had been revoked. 
The Defendant ever since said acquittal has filed numerous 
complaints against Officer Roper with the F.B.I.; Mayor of the 
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City of Logan; Chief of the Logan City Police Department; 
various Lieutenants of the Logan City Police Department; and 
one complaint to Logan City Prosecutor, Scott L. Wyatt who 
prosecuted this case, claiming that whenever Officer Roper 
observed him driving or walking down the streets of Logan City, 
Officer Roper would make a U-turn and stalk and harrass the 
Defendant by following the Defendant for substantial distances 
through the Logan City street for no apparent reason. Dispite, 
the Defendant's numerous complaints against Officer Roper, he 
continued to follow and harrass the Defendant as evidenced by 
the facts of this case. 
The Defendant was lawfully driving in a southerly direction 
on 100 East in Logan, Utah on November 7, 1992. The Defendant 
drove pass Officer Roper's vehicle which was parked in a 
northerly direction on the east side of the road at 300 North. 
Upon observing the Defendant, Officer Roper immediately made a 
U-turn from a parked position as the Defendant drove pass and 
began following and stalking the Defendant. The Defendant after 
being followed by Officer Roper for a three block distance made 
a right hand turn at Center Street to drive in a westerly 
direction. Officer Roper also made a right hand turn and 
followed the Defendant in a westerly direction. The Defendant 
immediately pulled to the right side of the road to avoid being 
followed by this particular Officer. Officer Roper drove pass 
the Defendant's vehicle very slowly. The Defendant pulled back 
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onto the roadway to drive in a westerly direction. Officer 
Roper turned at the intersection of Center Street and Main to 
drive in a notherly direction. The Defendant made a turn at 
the same intersection to drive in a northerly direction. 
Officer Roper was stopped at a red traffic semaphore at the 
intersection of 200 North and Main Street to drive in a norther-
ly direction. The Defendant drove into the right-hand turn lane 
and stopped at the light at the same intersection. The Defendant 
made a right hand turn to drive in a easterly direction on 200 
North. Officer Roper immediately turned right from the lane 
to drive in a northerly direction on Main and drove east and 
stopped behind the Defendant's vehicle. He approached the 
Defendant's vehicle and issued the Defendant a citation for 
following him too closely. [Officer Roper at the suppression 
hearing testified that he made a U-turn from a parked position 
at 300 North and 100 East for no apparent reason. He testified 
that he was not intentionally following the Defendant, that he 
just happened to be driving in the same direction as the Defendant 
and at no time did he stop or seize the Defendant. Officer Roper 
at trial testified that he made a U-turn from the same parked 
position and that he was intentionally following the Defendant 
because he could not tell whether the Defendant's vehicle 
registration had expired while observing the Defendant drive 
pass him from his parked position at 300 North and 100 East.] 
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Officer Roper testified at the trial held in the First 
Circuit Court on March 26, 1993, that after turning onto Main 
Street from Center Street on November 7, 1992, he was driving 
in a northerly direction at approximately 25 miles per hour 
while looking into his rear view mirror. He testified that 
while looking into his rear view mirror, the Defendant was 
following him too closely at approximately 25 North Main. He 
testified that based upon his experience in accident investigations 
and numerous assumptions, the Defendant's vehicle would have 
struck his vehicle based upon the assumption that he suddenly 
stopped. He testified that he could not recall what type of 
traffic was upon Main Street on November 7, 1992. There was no 
testimony adduced from Officer Roper or at trial as to the 
conditions of Main Street such as was the roadway dry; wet; 
or covered with ice or snow. 
Officer Roper on cross-examination admitted that there was 
no accident between the vehicles on November7, 1992. He also 
admitted that some mirrors are deceptive. He admitted that 
prior to November 7, 1992, the Defendant had previously filed 
numerous complaints against him for his alleged stalking, 
harrassing, and following the Defendant. He testified that the 
Defendant had filed so many complaints against him that he could 
not recount them all and that there had been publications in the 
Herald Journal relating to his harrassment of the Defendant. He 
also admitted that the Logan City Police Department does not have 
an Internal Affairs Division to investigate police misconduct and 
that no disciplinary action has been taken against him. 
-8-
The Defendant testified at the same trial that after turning 
onto Main Street from Center Street on November 7, 1992, he was 
driving behind Officer Roper at a distance of at least 15 feet 
and that he was driving at a rate of approximately 15 miles per 
hour. He testified that in about a quarter block distance 
another vehicle changed lanes and pulled behind Officer Roper's 
vehicle and in front of the Defendant's vehicle. He testified 
that when he arrived at the intersection of 200 North and Main 
Street, Officer Roperfs vehicle was stopped at the red light 
with one vehicle in front of him and one vehicle in back of him 
while in the lane to drive in a northerly direction. He testified 
that he made a right hand turn at this intersection to drive in 
a easterly direction on 200 North. He testified that immediately 
after turning onto 200 North, Officer Roper's vehicle made an 
easterly turn onto 200 and turned on his red emergency lights. 
The Defendant testified that he pulled to the right side of the 
roadway and stopped. Officer Roper approached his vehicle and 
requested Defendant's Driver License and Registration. The 
Defendant testified testified that Officer Roper issued him a 
citation. He testified that at the time Officer Roper issued the 
citation that Officer Roper wrote a phone number on the back of 
the citation and stated "if you have any more complaints about me 
harrassing you, call this phone number." [Officer Roper testified 
during the course of the trial that the phone number that he 
wrote on the back of the citation was that of the Logan City 
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Municipal Justice Court (750-7112), but could not recall any 
specific reason for writing the number on the back of the 
citation.] 
The Defendant testified that he had filed numerous complaints 
against Officer Roper for harrassment ever since December of 
1988. The Defendant testified on at least 100 different 
occassions prior to November 7, 1992, Officer Roper would make 
a U-turn when he observed the Defendant driving or walking and 
follow him to the grocery store; place of employment; defendant's 
immediate family's place of business; and numerous other places. 
The Defendant testified that despite his complaints against 
Officer Roper, he would continue to harrass, follow and stalk 
the Defendant. 
The Defendant during the course of the trial was not accorded 
any opportunity to object to the trial court's instruction to 
the jury. 
The Defendant did take exception to trial court's instruction 
to the jury on the elements of the offense of Following another 
Vehicle Too Closely because the elements were different and 
because the instruction did not require the jury to consider the 
factors of the traffic upon and the conditions of the highway 
as defined under Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-62. [Instruction No. 12]. 
The Defendant also took exception to the trial court's 
failure to give the standard Instruction given in all cases that 
"If you believe any witness has wilfully testified falsely, as 
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to any material fact in this case, you are at liberty to 
disregard the whole of the testimony of such witness, except 
as he/she may have been corroborated by other credible 
witnesses or credible evidence. 
The jury during their deliberations requested the trial 
court for additional instructions as to whether they could 
return with a recommendation rather than a verdict of guilty 
or innocense. The trial court instructed them that they would 
be required to return a verdict of guilty or not guilty. The 
jury after further deliberation returned a verdict of guilty. 
The Defendant thereupon made a verbal motion in arrest 
of judgment because of the insufficient evidence adduced at the 
trial and on grounds that the statute under which he was tried 
and convicted, Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-62 was unconstitutionally 
vague and applied and enforced in the case. The trial court 
denied Defendant's Motion in Arrest of Judgment and thereafter 
imposed judgment and sentence. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The Following Too Closely statute, Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-62, 
as applied and enforced in this case was unconstitutionally 
vague and as applied and enforced by the trial court violated 
the Separation of Powers provision under Article V, § 1 of 
the Utah Constitution. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
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THE APPLICATION OF UTAH CODE ANN. § 41-6-62 IN THIS CASE 
VIOLATED THE SEPARATION OF POWERS PROVISION OF THE 
UTAH CONSTITUTION AND RENDERED THE STATUTE UNCONSTI-
TUTIONALLY VAGUE. 
The Defendant contends that the application and enforce-
ment of the Following Too Closely statute, Utah Code Ann. 
§ 41-6-62, (1987 Amendment) violation the separation of 
pwoers provision of Article V, § 1 of the Utah Constitution 
and rendered the statute unconstitutionally vague. 
The Utah Supreme Court in State v. Gallion, 572 P.2d 
683, 687, (Utah 1977) held that the determination of the 
elements of a crime and the appropriate punishment therefor 
are under our [Utah] Constitutional system, judgments, which 
must be made exclusively by the legislature. 
The Defendant in this case was charged by Information with 
the offense of Following another Vehicle Too Closely in violation 
of Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-62. 
The elements of the offense of Following another vehicle 
too closely as enacted by the Utah Legislature under the pro-
visions of Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-62 are as follows: 
(1) The operator of a vehicle may not follow another 
vehicle more closely than is reasonable and prudent, 
having regard for the speed of the vehicles and the 
traffic upon and the condition of the highway. 
The Utah Supreme Court held that it is for the legislature, 
not the courts, to define what constitutes criminal conduct. 
State v. Johnson, 44 Utah 18, 137 P. 632 (1913). 
The trial court instructed the jury [Instruction No. 12] 
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as to the elements necessary for a conviction of Following 
another Vehicle Too Closely as follows: 
Before you may convict the Defendant of following 
too close, you must find from the evidence beyond 
a reasonable doubt, all of the following elements 
of that crime, to-wit: 
1. That the Defendant was driving a motor vehicle at 
the time and place as alleged in the Information. 
2. That the Defendant was driving in Logan City, 
Cache County, State of Utah. 
3. That the distance maintained by the defendant 
between vehicles was not reasonable and prudent. 
There was no instruction given to the jury that it would 
be necessary for them to consider the factors as to the 
traffic upon and the conditions of the highway as defined 
under § 41-6-62 based upon the evidence adduced at trial. 
The Defendant in this case was not found guilty by the 
jury of the offense of Following Too Close as enacted by the 
Utah Legislature under § 41-6-62, but was convicted for the 
offense of Following Too Close as created and defined by the 
trial court in its instructions to the jury. 
The trial court's elimination to the two factors to be 
considered by the jury of the traffic upon and the conditions 
of the highway as defined under § 41-6-62 violated the separation 
of powers provisions under Article V, § 1 of the Utah Constitution. 
The trial court had no constitutional authority to give a jury 
instruction which describes a criminal offense differently 
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than as the offense was enacted by the Utah Legislature. 
The Defendant further contends that the offense of 
Following Too Close as defined by the trial court in its 
instruction to the jury is unconstitutionally vague in violation 
of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the 
United States Constitution. Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 
352, 357-358, 75 L.Ed.2d 903, 909, 103 S.Ct. 1855 (1983). 
The Defendant in this case did not receive actual notice 
prior to trial on March 26, 1993 that the offense of Following 
Too Close was defined as the offense was defined in the trial 
courtfs instruction to the jury as to the elements of the 
offense. State v. Blowers, 717 P.2d 1321 (Utah 1986). 
What was reasonable and prudent to the Defendant was not 
reasonable and prudent to Officer Roper. 
Furthermore, the offense of Following Too Close as defined 
by the trial court failed to establish minimal guidelines to 
govern law enforcement in their enforcement of the offense. 
CONCLUSION 
The Defendant respectfully submits that the application and 
enforcement of Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-62 and the trial court's 
instructions as to the elements of the offense, violated the 
separation of powers provisions of Article V, § 1 of the Utah 
Constitution and rendered the statute unconstitutionally vague 
-14-
as applied and enforced in this case in violation of the 
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the 
United States Constitution. The Defendant respectfully 
submits that on the foregoing basis and on the basis that 
he was not convicted by the jury for the offense of Following 
Too Close as defined by the Utah Legislature under Utah Code 
Ann. § 41-6-62, his conviction for the offense of Following 
Too Close should be reversed by this Honorable Court. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED on this 19th day of January, 1995. 
DAVID CRAIG CARL^N 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify that I mailed two true and correct copies of 
the foregoing Brief of Appellant to the following listed 
below on this 19th day of January, 1995: 
Scott L. Wyatt 
Logan City Prosecutor 
255 North Main 
Logan, Utah 84321 
^^hyi^^^^ 
DAVID CRAIG CARE&EN 
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A D D E N D U M 
- 1 6 -
INSTRUCTION NO. 
Before you may convict the Defendant of following too cl«se/ you must 
find from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt/ all of the following 
elements of that crime, to-wit: 
1. That the Defendant was driving a motor vehicle at the time and 
place as alleged in the Information. 
2. That the Defendant was driving in Logan City, Cache County, State 
of Utah. 
3. That the distance maintained by the defendant between vehicles 
was not reasonable and prudent. 
If you believe that the evidence establishes each and all of the 
essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt/ it is your 
duty to find the defendant guilty of this offense. On the other hand, if 
the evidence has failed to so establish one or more of the said elements, 
then you should find the defendant not guilty of this offense. 
IN THE LOGAN CITY MUNICIPAL JUSTICE COURT 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff ] 
vs. ; 
CARLSEN, David Craig ] 
316 South Main #9 
Logan, Utah ] 
3/5/45 
Defendant 
> I N F O R M A T I O N 
No. 92-6555 
The STATE OF UTAH, upon evidence and belief, charges the above-named 
Defendant with the commission of the following public offense(s): 
COUNT 1: 
CRIME: FOLLOWING TOO CLOSE 
CLASSIFICATION: CLASS C MISDEMEANOR 
IN VIOLATION OF: 41-6-62, Utah Code Annotated 
AT: Logan, Utah 
ON OR ABOUT: 11/7/92 
The acts of the Defendant constituting the public offense(s) were: 
That the said Defendant, being the driver of a motor vehicle, did then and there 
on the streets of Logan City, follow another vehicle more closely than was 
reasonable and prudent having due regard for the speed of such vehicle and the 
traffic upon the conditions of the street. 
This information is based on evidence obtained from the following witnesses: 
R. J. ROPER, LCPD 
R. J. PETERSON, LCPD 
DATED:/2 - / - ?^~ 
DAMAGES: YES NO 
Date Filed: /,?-/- Q£L 
DAVID CRAIG CARLSEN 
Defendant in Pro Se 
P.O. Box 148 
Logan, Utah 84323-0148 
LOGAN CITY MUNICIPAL JUSTICE COURT 
CACHE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
^ . ,.„ DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS 
Plaintiff, 
-vs-
DAVID CRAIG CARLSEN, 
Case No. 92-06555 
Defendant. 
COMES NOW, the above-named defendant, David Craig Carlsen, 
and hereby respectfully moves this Honorable Court for an Order 
dismissing the Information and charges filed against the defendant 
in the above-entitled matter. 
The basis for this motion is that the Following Too Close 
statute, U.C.A. Section 43-6-62, (]953 as amended) under which the 
defendant is charged for violating is unconstitutionally vague 
both on its face and as applied by Logan City Police Officer 
Russell Roper in violation of Article I, Section 7 of the Utah 
Constitution and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
to the United States Constitution, State v. Blowers, 717 P.2d 
1321 (Utah 1986 and State v. Bradshaw, 541 P.2d 800 (Utah 1975). 
DATED this 7th day of December, 1992. 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Motion to Dismiss to Scott L,. Wyatt, Logan City Prosecutor, 
located at 255 North Main, Logan, Utah, 84321, and the Cache 
County Attorney's Office located at 110 North 100 West, Logan, 
Utah, 84321, postage prepaid and by placing the same in a U.S. 
Mailbox on this 7th day of December, 1992. 
DAVID CRAIG CARLSEN 
Defendant in Pro Se 
P.O. Box 348 
Logan, Utah 84323-0148 
CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF CACHE, LOGAN CITY DEPARTMENT 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
-vs-
DAVID CRAIG CARLSEN, 
Defendant. 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS 
EVIDENCE 
Case No. 92500323] 
COMES NOW, the above-named defendant, David Craig Carlsen, 
and hereby respectfully moves this Honorable Court for an Order 
to suppress the evidence and testimony of Logan City Police Officer, 
Russell J. Roper. 
The basis for this motion is that Russell J. Roper did not 
have a reasonable suspicion or articulable suspicion based upon 
objective facts that the defendant had committed a crime or involved 
in criminal activity on the alleged date of the incident when Officer 
Roper made a U-turn from a parked position and began stalking or 
following the defendant's vehicle and thereafter stopping said 
defendant, and issuing a citation to defendant in lieu of an arrest. 
As the evidence at a hearing on this matter will show, the defendant 
prior to the date of this alleged incident has filed numerous 
complaints against Officer Russell J. Roper with the Logan City 
Mayor, Logan City Police Department, Logan City Prosecutor, Scott L. 
Wyatt; and an agent for the F.B.I, claiming that Russell J. Roper 
has continued to stalk or follow the defendant while on duty 
through the streets and sidewalks of Logan City without a reasonable 
or articulable suspicion that defendant has committed a crime or 
involved in criminal activity since the time the defendant was 
acquitted of charges of Driving on Revocation at proceedings held 
in First Circuit Court in December, 1988 of which said charges were 
brought against the defendant by Russell J. Roper and Officer Greg 
Monroe of the Logan City Police Department. The said stalking or 
following of the defendant has deprived the defendant of his rights 
to free locomotion and the right to travel as secured under the 
privileges and immunities under the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, Shapiro v. 
Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 at 634 (3969); and Memorial Hospital v. 
Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250 (1974). Russell J. Roper stalking 
or following the defendant on the alleged date of this incident was 
based upon a mere "hunch" and perhaps retaliation for the numerous 
complaints filed against him by the defendant and was not based upon 
any reasonable or articulable suspicion and the testimony of Russell 
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J. Roper and all evidence should be suppressed as being the fruits 
of the poisonous tree. 
DATED this 14th day of January, 1993, 
DAVID CRAIG CSRLSEN J# H^ 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify that I hand-delivered a true and exact copy of the 
foregoing Motion to Suppress Evidence to Scott L. Wyatt, Attorney 
for Plaintiff by leaving a copy thereof at the Logan City Prosecutor's 
Office located at 255 North Main, Logan, Utah on this ]4th day of 
January, ]993. 
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TRAFFIC RULES AND REGULATIONS 41-6-63.10 
41-6-62. Following another vehicle — Safe distance — Car-
avan or motorcade — Exception for funeral pro-
cession. 
(1) The operator of a vehicle may not follow another vehicle more closely 
than is reasonable and prudent, having regard for the speed of the vehicles 
and the traffic upon and the condition of the highway. 
(2) Motor vehicles operated upon any roadway outside of an urban district, 
whether in a caravan, motorcade, or otherwise, or whether or not towing other 
vehicles, shall allow sufficient space between each vehicle or combination of 
vehicles to enable any other vehicle to enter and occupy the space without 
danger. This provision does not apply to funeral processions. 
History: L. 1941, ch. 52, § 52; C. 1943, 
57-7-129; L. 1949, ch. 65, * 1; 1975, ch. 207, 
fi 19; 1978, ch. 33, § 15; 1987, ch. 138, § 61. 
AMENDMENTS Amend. XIV, § 3 
AMENDMENT XIV 
Section 
f S z e n s h i p - Due process of law -Equal 4. [Public debt not to bequestioned - Debt*>of 
1
 Vtect ion. ] the Confederacy and claims not 
2. {Representatives — Power to reduce ap- to be paid.] 
pointment.] 5. [Power to enforce amendment.] 
3. [Disqualification to hold office.] 
Section 1. [Citizenship — Due process of law — Equal 
protection.] 
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the 
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein 
they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the 
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State 
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor 
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. 
ARTICLE V 
DISTRIBUTION OF POWERS 
Section 
1. [Three departments of government.] 
Section 1. [Three departments of f - J ^ ^ ^
 int0 
The powers of the ^ e r ^ e n ^ n ^ ^ f ^ J ^ * • ***£ 
three distinct d e p u t e £ e ^ 
and no person charged ^ * ^ X functions appertaining to either of the 
these departments shall e x e ™ J . ^ ^ i y directed or permitted, 
others, except in the cases herein express y 
Legislative department, Utah Const., Art. 
a s s i s t Executive depart- V L ^ ^ ^
 n o t d e l e g a b le , Utah 
^ r d e ^ e n f u ^Const., Art. VDL Const., Art. VI, i 28. 
